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Democratic leaders, the liberal press, intellectuals, and the majority of the public in 
Russia have voiced their despair with the dimensions of the political crisis in the country 
during the last few months, and have expressed fears of a possible military coup. There 
are new voices in Russia, saying that a government led by military officers seems to be 
the only logical solution to pull the state out of the abyss of crime, corruption and 
anarchy.
Critics say that Boris Yel'tsin has never been more impotent in performing his 
presidential duties. It is no secret that the Chechnya war was the harshest blow to his 
already shattered political image. However, what appears to be more serious is that 
Yel'tsin himself implied that he had lost control of the situation. In his Federal Assembly 
speech on February 16, he said that there are other people who are using "the 
president's hands."(1) Grigori Yavlinsky, the leader of Yabloko faction in the Russian 
parliament, raised the same concern in his recent presentation at Harvard University, 
saying that power was shifting from the hands of the president to unknown persons and 
that this was becoming dangerous.(2) In front of the Ostankino television building after 
the murder of Russia's most popular television journalist, Vladislav Listyev, Yel'tsin once 
again shrugged his shoulders, saying that he had failed to combat organized crime 
because of "his government's inability to adopt radical measures."(3)
Recent developments in Russia, however, suggest that the president is taking radical 
measures, not to combat crime, but rather to ensure his leadership despite his widening 
unpopularity. Russian human rights activists are becoming more and more concerned 
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with the creation of new enforcement structures in the federal security apparatus, and 
the broad powers being given to the KGB's successor.
The law signed by Yel'tsin on April 3 allows the Federal Security Service to break into 
Russian citizens' homes and offices, tap their telephones, open mail, and place spies 
inside state agencies and in private companies, on mere suspicion of criminal conduct. 
Moreover, no prior permission from the prosecutor's office or the courts is required for 
such actions.(4) One can find a plethora of inconsistencies in this legislation, stemming 
not only from its obscure and ambiguous language but also from obvious contradictions. 
On the one hand, the measure suggests that "the state guarantees the observance of 
human rights and civil liberties" by taking such steps and that "counterintelligence 
activity affecting the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, 
telegraphic and other messages" depends on a court decision. On the other hand, the 
text retains a provision which allows a security officer to enter citizens' homes without 
hindrance if "there is a sufficient reason to suppose that a crime is being or has been 
perpetrated there...or if pursuing persons suspected of committing a crime..."(5)
Particularly worrisome is the absence of a regulatory agency, since counterintelligence 
activities are not overseen by parliament. Nor does Russia's constitution mention 
oversight of the Russian security organs, so that the way is open for Yel'tsin's reliance 
on these structures for the pursuit of his own political interests.
On the other hand, the proliferation of enforcement structures could actually limit the 
Russian president's executive power. Last May, the State Duma Committee on Defense 
discussed the creation of special mobile troops (in addition to the army and MVD forces) 
as well as the resurrection of military units within the Federal Counterintelligence 
Service and the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information.(6) 
Together with the recently approved creation of an elite Presidential Guard this has 
resulted in a plethora of paramilitary entities theoretically under the president's 
command. The inefficiency of such a cumbersome structure could distort the president's 
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decisions as they filter down to local executive levels. From the same complicated 
system the head of state may have difficulty obtaining objective feedback.(7)
It is possible that the present government may be forced to leave power not as a result 
of a massive social explosion but rather by intervention of the same military and security 
apparat that is supposedly serving the president. Such fears are expressed more and 
more frequently in the Russian press together with the hypothesis that the same 
enforcement structures could try to assume power under the slogans of "Reinstating 
Law and Order and Liquidation of Corruption." Voices about Russia's reaching a dead-
end street under Boris Yel'tsin's leadership are increasingly intertwined with claims that 
a successful military coup is the panacea for all troubles.(8)
Even a military leader like Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed', who stood by the 
president's side during the aborted coup of 1991, is now openly expressing his 
contempt of Yel'tsin. Becoming a favorite among nationalists and sections of the military, 
Lebed' is viewed as a strong candidate in the presidential elections, scheduled for June 
1996. However, there is a chance that the elections might not take place and that a 
state of emergency might be imposed. In a recent interview with Time magazine, Lebed' 
said that only the armed forces could prevent the country from falling apart, and that the 
politicians themselves have pushed the army in this direction. In Russia, he said, 
military issues cannot be separated from political questions.(9)
Dashed expectations concerning economic reforms and the creation of democratic 
institutions have resulted in Western models of democracy appearing less and less 
attractive to Russian citizens. At the same time, strong nationalistic tendencies are 
becoming more popular. Many Russians perceive that some of Yel'tsin's inane political 
judgments receive silent approval from the United States and Western Europe, raising 
concerns that the countries of the industrial world do not understand or do not care 
about what is happening in Russia.(10)
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Zhirinovsky's slogans about the country being sold out to the West were reflected in a 
document, published by Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service in January 1995, 
warning of a real threat from the West. The material, printed in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
accuses several hundred Western universities, research centers and non-governmental 
foundations of conducting "subversive activities in Russia."(11) The document claims 
that although the purported aim of these institutions is to help Russia move toward 
democracy and a market economy, and to train professionals, the real purpose of their 
activities is to prevent Russia from becoming once again a superpower and a potential 
rival of the United States.
The authors of the document suggest that these institutions gather information for the 
US intelligence service through analysis of the Russian media; through the use of 
Russian library materials; and through unrestricted travel in Russia, etc. The most 
alarming fact is that the document proposes to impose restrictions on travel abroad for 
persons with "knowledge of secret information in the area of national security, defense 
or science." However, even wider restrictions seem to be implied, covering a broader 
range of contacts between the Russian intellectual elite and Western institutions, 
including universities. It states boldly that "an efficient system should be created to 
prevent gathering of information by foreign intelligence services."
The document goes so far as to allege that the United States is trying to recruit potential 
presidential candidates and other political leaders for education in America. Particularly 
disturbing is the implication that the media in Russia constitute a primary information 
source for foreign "subversive activities" since what the media print or broadcast is 
"analyzed" in the West.
Recently, the mutual distrust in the government-media relationship has deepened, 
taking a new turn. For the first time in many decades, organs of power and the media 
are standing on diametrically opposite platforms in their statements concerning Russian 
reality. This is apparent not only in the striking discrepancies between Moscow's official 
press releases on the situation in Chechnya and journalists' reports from Grozny, but 
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also in the authorities' open harassment of investigative reporters who write about 
corruption and crime in Russia.
The government has reasons to worry: A recent poll conducted by the Public Opinion 
foundation has shown that only 14 percent of Russians trust reports from government 
sources, while 46 percent give preference to information coming from non-governmental 
institutions.(12) The Moscow Charter of Journalists has stated that the political crisis 
which turned into a war in Chechnya had been an excuse for large-scale violations of 
journalists' rights. Yel'tsin himself accused the Russian media of being bought by 
Dudayev to criticize Russian government policy in Chechnya.(13) Moreover, the 
Russian Duma has vilified the press for its destructive role in society. In January, there 
was parliamentary discussion of a document which condemned the media as the new 
enemy of Russia. Leonid Shershnev, the head of the National and International Security 
Fund, said at the Duma meeting that the media are a threat to national security and are 
engaged in a war against the Russian people.(14)
A significant proportion of journalists and political analysts in Russia have no illusions 
about the president's new political face. In his recent article in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
Aleksandr Konovalov, the head of the Center for Military Policy and System Analysis at 
the Institute for the Study of the US and Canada, wrote that Yel'tsin "had become bored 
with playing the game of democracy," and had entirely changed his political 
identification. Konovalov added, "[Yel'tsin] will never win again in any democratic 
elections. But maybe it is already decided that no elections will take place?"(15)
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